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A PROBLEM I N  KINSHIP TERMINOLOGY By LESLIE A. WHITE 
HE “Dakota-Iroquois” type of kinship nomenclature-in which T mother’s brother is called “uncle” and his children “cousin” and in 
which father’s sister is called “aunt” and her children “cousin”-is closely 
associated with tribes organized into clans, either matrilineal or patrilineal. 
The Crow type of kinship terminology-in which mother’s brother is an 
“uncle,” and his children “son” and “daughter,” and father’s sister is an 
“aunt,” and her children “father” and “aunt”-is closely associated with 
matrilineal clans but not with patrilineal clans.’ The Omaha type of nomen- 
clature-in which mother’s brother is “uncle,” and his children “uncles” 
and “mothers;” father’s sister is “aunt,” and her children “sister’s son and 
daughter”-is associated with a patrilineal, but not with a matrilineal,’ 
clan system.2 Thus we have the following facts: 1. There are three types of 
kinship nomenclature intimately connected with clan organization. 2. Of 
these, one is adaptable to either matrilineal or patrilineal clans, whereas 
each of the other two is adaptable to only one kind of unilateral descent. 
3. The Crow and Omaha systems on the one hand are distinguished from 
the Dakota-Iroquois system on the other by the fact that  in the former two 
the principle of generation is ignored a t  many points in the classification of 
relatives-one has “fathers,” “aunts,” brothers,” etc. on each generation 
level-whereas in the latter system this principle is observed throughout. 
From a consideration of these facts two questions arise: 1. Why is it 
that some kinship systems disregard the principle of generation while 
others observe this principle? 2. Why is it that some tribes with matrilineal 
(.patrilineal) clans have the Iroquoisa (Dakota) type of terminology while 
other tribes, also with matrilineal (patrilineal) clans, have the Crow (Oma- 
ha) type? 
Professor Robert H. Lowie, who has, perhaps, concerned himself with 
problems of kinship terminologies more extensively than any other Ameri- 
can anthropologist of our day, has raised these questions in his article Rela- 
t iofiship Terms. But his answer is virtually limited to the suggestion: “It is 
conceivable that the Omaha and Crow varieties of the bifurcate merging 
type depend upon additional jactors that may some time be discovered” (p. 
There may be exceptions to this rule as there are to other generalizations in science. 
a See The Distribution of Kinship Systems in North America, by Leslie Spier (Univ. of 
Washington Publications in Anthropology, Vol. I, No. 2,  Seattle, 1925); article Relationship 
Terms, by R. H. Lowie, in Encyclopedia Rritannica (14th ed.) for a description of types of 
kinship nomenclature. 
* We may refer to the Dakota-Iroquois system as Iroquois when it is associated with 
matrilineal clans, Dakota when associated with patrilineal. 
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89; italics ours). Returning to the problem some years later: Lowie explains 
the merging of generations in the designation of maternal uncle and ma- 
ternal uncle’s son among the Omaha and the Miwok by citing the fact that  
in each tribe a man is permitted to marry the daughter of his wife’s brother. 
But this form of marriage would not explain why, in the Omaha type, fa- 
ther’s sister’s children are called “sister’s son and daughter,” instead of 
“cousin” or “sibling.” Moreover, this sort of explanation would not be 
applicable to such a people as the Hopi (with the Crow type) who do not 
permit marriages of this sort. 
Professor Lowie goes on to say that  it might be necessary to find “ad- 
ditional determinants” to “explain all occurrences of the phenomenon.” 
But to advance special theories, each based upon an “additional deter- 
minant,” to account for special instances in which the Crow or Omaha types 
occur is not enough. I t  is like having one theory for falling leaves, another 
for meteorites, a third for snow flakes, and so on. What is needed is, of 
course, a general theory that will embrace all “special instances” just as 
one formula embraces all instances of falling bodies. We are confronted 
here with one problem, not several. The questions-Why do some kinship 
systems observe the principle of generation in the classification of relatives 
while other systems violate it at points? Why do some tribes with matri- 
lineal (patrilineal) clans have the Iroquois (Dakota) type of kinship ter- 
minology while other tribes, also with matrilineal (patrilineal) clans have 
the Crow (Omaha) type of nomenclature, are merely aspects of a single 
problem. We propose to solve this problem with a single theory. 
A kinship nomenclature is a mechanism whose function is the classifica- 
tion of relatives. Among tribes having the bifurcate merging type of nomen- 
clature (the Dakota and Omaha, the Iroquois and the Crow), there are two 
agencies, each having as one of its functions the classification of relatives: 
the family and the clan (gens).6 Thus members of the tribe are classified 
In Cultural Anthropology: a Science (American Journal of Sociology, Vol. XLII, No. 3, 
Nov. 1936). 
6 By “family,” we mean a bilateral social unit based on marriage; it includes primarily 
parents, children, and, secondarily, kindred on both sides. This is a composite of Lowie’s defi- 
nitions which may be found on p. 63, Primitive Society; p. 246, Inlrodwction to Cultural An- 
thropology; p. 53, The Family as a Social Unit (Proceedings of the Michigan Academy of Arts 
and Sciences for 1932, Ann Arbor, 1933). 
By “clan (or sib)” we mean a unilateral kinship group, one formed by reckoning descent 
on one side of the family only. A clan is one of a number of structurally equivalent segments 
into which a tribe may be divided, Each clan distinguishes itself from the others by a name. 
Clans are exogamous except when very young and undeveloped, or when very old, after they 
have begun to decay and disintegrate. 
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in accordance with two different principles: the one with reference to the 
constellations of relatives which we call families; the other with reference 
to tribal segments, clans. Since both clan and family are engaged, a t  one 
point, in doing the same thing-classifying relatives-and since they pro- 
ceed from different points of reference, they are rivals, competitors, so to 
speak, in the game of relative-classification. Thus a person might be desig- 
nated by a kinship term because of a family relationship, or he might be 
designated because of his clan affiliation, depending upon which principle, 
family or clan, was the more influential.6 Among the Hopi, for example, I 
(a male) call my father’s sister’s son “father.” I call the son of my father’s 
sister’s daughter “father.” In fact, I call all males in my father’s clan 
“father.” I do not designate these individuals “father” because of their 
position in the constellation of relatives which is my family. I designate 
them as I do because of clala ties.’ The systems of terminology which “over- 
ride the generation principle” do so because the clan predominates over the 
family as the agency which determines how the relative shall be designated 
a t  those points where the generation principle is violated. 
Now the question arises, why is it that in some tribes with clans the 
generation principle is violated while in other tribes with clans it is not? 
The family is a much older institution than the clan; everywhere the 
clan has been preceded, in point of time, by the family.* Clans did not ap- 
pear in the earliest stage of social evolution; they came later.g But this does 
not mean, of course, that “the clan evolved out of the family,” for it did not. 
Each institution has had its own generative forces, each its own history.I0 
8 Dr Elsie Clews Parsons has called attention to this “rivalry” at the Keresan pueblo of 
Laguna, New Mexico. In her Luguna Genealogies (Anthropological Papers, American Museum 
of Natural History, Vol. XIX, Pt. V, New York, 1923) she has a section entitled Preference of 
clan to kin terms, which begins, “In several cases, I noted that terms due to clan connection 
were preferred to terms due to kin connection,” p. 210. 
7 I t  was Professor Lowie who made the first extensive study of Hopi kinship. The “clan 
concept,” he concluded, “has exerted a deep influence upon i t  [Hopi kinship nomenclature],” 
Hopi Kinship, Anthropological Papers, American Museum of Natural History, Vol. XXX, 
Pt. VIT, New York, 1929, p. 383. 
8 “While no people lacks the family, many societies are without clans,” R. H. Lowie, A n  
Introduction to Cultural Anthropology, p. 256. Also, “the bilateral family is an absolutely uni- 
versal institution; on the other hand, the unilateral sib has only a restricted though wide dis- 
tribution.” Lowie, Primitive Society, p. 147. 
0 ‘‘Clans do not arise in the very earliest stage of society, but on somewhat higher levels 
. . . ”, Lowie, An Introduction to Cultural Anthropology, p. 256. 
10 Why clans came into existence is an important question, to be sure, but one that need 
not be discussed here since it is irrelevant to our argument. We accept the clan as “given.” 
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The clan, like many other social institutions, has a beginning, a period 
of infancy, of maturity, and of senescence.“ A t  a certain stage of cultural 
development it disappears completely.12 Thus a resume of social evolution 
would run as follows: in a very early, if not the earliest stage of develop- 
ment we find the family, but not the clan. At  a later, more advanced stage 
(or “on higher levels,” to use Professor Lowie’s phraseology) clans appear 
in some cultures.13 Clans develop from incipience to maturity, and finally 
die out a t  still higher levels .of cultural development. Thus, a t  a certain 
stage of social evolution, we find some peoples with both family and sib 
organization. This is the situation which concerns us here. 
In its infancy a clan system would play an insignificant role in the soci- 
ety of which it was a part; it would exert little influence upon the kinship 
n0menc1ature.l~ As it grew and matured, however, as it became more in- 
fluential, the clan system would exert more and more influence upon the 
kinship nomenclature16 until it had triumphed over the family as a classify- 
ing agent a t  various points. Thus the “additional factors” that Professor 
Lowie thinks may “some day be discovered” which will explain why some 
types of nomenclature‘loverride the generation princip1e”and others do not, 
turn out to be fairly simple: the type which violates the generation principle is 
an outgrowth of the type which does not, and is due to  the injluence of a ful ly  
mature, injluential clan system. When the clan system is young and weak the 
kinship system will be of the Dakota-Iroquois type, regardless of the sex in 
which descent is reckoned. A s  the clan system develops, however, and comes to 
l1 “ . . . what is true of the sib scheme in full swing cannot possibly be true of the nascent 
sib,” Lowie, Primitive Society, p. 162. 
“ . . . the Greeks are known to have passed through a period in which they were organized 
into sibs. But this may simply indicate that a t  a certain level the sib system tends to decay 
. . . ”, Ibid., p. 147. 
I* Lowie speaks of clans “ultimately disappearing under a strong centralized govern- 
ment,” A n  Introduction lo Ctrltwal Anthropology, p. 256. Similarly, Professor E. Sapir says that 
“ . . . the clan tends to atrophy with the growth of political institutions . , . ”, Anthropology 
and Sociology, in The Social Sciences and their Interreldions, Wm. F. Ogburn and Alexander 
Goldenweiser, eds. (New York, 1927), p. 107. Their observations are not novel, however. The 
great American evolutionist, Lewis H. Morgan, made the same observations and illuminated 
the whole problem of the obsolescence and disappearance of the clan many years before Lowie 
and Sapir were born. 
Is But not necessarily in all cultures. Segmentation of a tribe may take a form other than 
the clan form, as, e.g., in the New Mexican pueblos of Isleta and Taos. 
l4 “An institution . . . may not yet have had time to assert itself terminologically,” Lowie, 
Relationship Terms, p. 89. 
16 “There can be little doubt that when a sib organization is once h l y  established it will 
react upon the method of designating relatives . . ”, Lowie, Primitive Society, p. 162. 
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exprt i t s  injuertce more and more u p o n  the social l i fe of the tribe, the Dakota- 
Iroquois terminology will be transformed irtto the Crow t ype  in a matril ineal 
society and in to  the Omaha type irt a patrililzeal society.I6 
To be sure, the expression of the “clan principle” or of the “family prin- 
ciple” in the classification of relatives will always be conditioned by many 
factors such as occupation, mode of residence, marriage customs, and SO on, 
as Professor Lowie has aptly pointed out. But, variation of expression does 
not mean lack of uniformity of principle, or absence of principle. The fact 
that smoke rises and rain falls does not mean that there is no law of gravi- 
tation. The fact that lead falls more rapidly than cotton does not mean lack 
of uniformity in the law which describes falling bodies. The fact is that the 
law which describes falling bodies describes an ideal situation; it does not 
describe any real event. In the “practical application” of the law of falling 
bodies one has to take account of the factors which condition its concrete 
expression, such as density of the atmosphere or other medium through 
which the body falls, specific gravity and shape of the body, etc. So also in 
“using” our theory of the principles operative in kinship systems, one has to 
take account of all the factors which, in any given situation, condition the 
concrete expression of these principles. 
Furthermore, we must call attention to the fact that how the Crow and 
Omaha types of nomenclature are brought into existence, and why this  or that 
tribe possesses the Crow or Omaha type,  are two different matters. A tribe may 
have the Crow type of terminology because it has developed it within itself, 
or because it has borrowed it fromsome other tribe.17 Thus it would be pos- 
sible for a tribe to possess the more advanced type of kinship terminology 
through borrowing, while another tribe in which the clan system is actually 
more highly developed, possesses the less advanced type of terminology 
because it has not progressed sufficiently to  develop it within its own re- 
sources, and has not acquired it through borrowing.l8 Hence, an apparent 
discrepancy of this sort would not, of itself, invalidate our theory. Nor 
l e  In  societies where the clan is relatively undevcloped and unimportant, the clan organi- 
zation is only partially expressed in the kinship terminology; the presence of clans is reflected, 
but the gender of  the clans remains undisclosed. Rut as the clan system develops and grows in 
importance, the gender, matrilineal or patrilineal, of the clans is impressed upon the kinship 
nomenclatures as well. 
l7 Professor Lowie has very aptly drawn this distinction, pointing out the fact that  when 
we have accounted for the possession of a trait by a certain tribe by showing that it has bor- 
rowed the trait in question, we have not in any way shown how the trait came into being in 
the first instance, Cultural Anthropology: a Science, p. 317. 
In Similarly, a tribe might habitually use and even work metals secured from other peo- 
ples and yet be technologically inferior, in general, to a tribe that used no metals a t  all. 
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would a statistical statement showing “percentages of tribes’’ following 
this or that course be anything but misleading since we could not know, in 
most cases, whether a phenomenon observed in a number of tribes is to be 
regarded as a one or as a many.lg The evaluation of the theory must come 
from (1) an analysis and comparison of representative cultures such as 
those of the Iroquois and the Hopi, the Ojibwa and the Omaha; (2) a study 
of the functions of clans and families with reference to kinship classifica- 
tion, and ( 3 )  a consideration of the processes of social evolution. 
A theory is of value if it illuminates, if it explains, if it makes things in- 
telligible. It must, of course, have a maximum possible correspondence with 
observed fact. But if it contributes understanding i t  is valuable, and pro- 
vides a new basis for further exploration into the unknown. This is what we 
claim for our theory. It sheds light where there was obscurity. It yields 
understanding where there was perplexity. It illuminates aspects of kin- 
ship systems and of social organization alike. Therein lies its value. 
The explanation that we have offered is, of course, one inspired by an 
evolutionary view of culture: institutions, cultures, grow, develop, evolve. 
The fundamental process in cultural (superorganic) phenomena as well as 
in organic and even inorganic,Z0 phenomena is, in the judgment of the pres- 
ent writer, evolutionary. The application of the viewpoint and principles 
of the philosophy of evolution is as essential to the solution of many prob- 
lems in culturology as it is in biology or physics.21 
Professor Lowie has been one of the most assiduous and vigorous OP- 
ponents of evolutionism in culture among twentieth century22 anthropolo- 
l8  “The statistical technique has been proved inadequate in several respects. . . . Tylor 
does not seem to distinguish between cases reducible to a single place of origin and others 
where several or many foci are probable,” Lowie, The History of Ethnological Theory (New 
York, 1937), pp. 79-80. 
Z o  Stars evolve and “die.” (See article Stellar Evolution, by the distinguished astronomer 
Henry Norris Russel, in Encyclopedia Britannica, 14th ed.) The disintegration of radioactive 
substances is an example of evolutionary process in the inorganic realm. Then there is evolu- 
tion of the universe, discussed, e.g., by R. A. Millikan, Sir James Jeans, Abbe Lemaitre, De- 
Sitter, A. S. Eddington, et al, in the proceedings of the British Association for the Advance- 
ment of Science, 1931. 
21 See, Science i s  Sciencing, by the present writer (Philosophy of Science, Vol. 5,  No. 4, 
1938). 
a Lowie’s Primitive Society, written, as he implies in the preface, to take the place of the 
evolutionist Morgan’s A ncient Society, is, perhaps, the outstanding anti-evolutionary treatise 
in American anthropology. See, e.g., his expressive statement in the last chapter, which closes 
with the declaration that civilization i5 but ‘‘8 thing of shreds and patches,” “a planless hodge- 
podge,” “a chaotic jumble.” 
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gists, who, by and large, are either anti-evolutionistsza or non-evolutionists. 
Having repudiated the philosophy and principles of evolution in culture, 
Professor Lowie is, naturally, unable to discern things which are illumined 
by the lamp of evolutionism alone. We venture to suggest that this is why 
he has failed to see the significance of the relationship between the Dakota 
and Iroquois types of nomenclature on the one hand and the Omaha and 
Crow types on the other. 
This is all the more remarkable because Professor Lowie has grasped 
all of the important relevant facts and has seen their significance singly. 
He has seen that certain types of kinship nomenclature are associated with 
clans. He has seen, furthermore, that when a clan system is “firmly estab- 
lished,” it will react upon the method of designating relatives. Where the 
sib organization is firmly established, he says, “all males in the father’s 
sib are addressed as father.”24 Thus he sees, in this instance a t  least, that  
the violation of the generation principle is associated with, if not due to, a 
“firmly established” (i.e., highly developed) clan system. Professor Lowie 
is aware of the fact that clans do grow, develop, evolve, from birth, infancy, 
through maturity, until “at a certain level . . . [they] tend to decay.” His 
language is often that of the evolutionist; he speaks of “stages of culture,” 
“higher levels.” Yet so imbued is he with the philosophy of anti-evolution- 
ism which has dominated American anthropology during the present cen- 
tury, that although he has all of the pieces, he cannot put them together,26 
and is obliged to cast about for “additional factors.” 
We hardly need to look for “additional factors” in order to render in- 
telligible to us kinship terminologies that are already known to us, if by 
“additional factors’’ we mean merely more facts. To be of use, of course, 
the additional facts would have to be of a new kind, not merely “addition- 
al”: another example of this or that type of nomenclature added to the 
scores of examples that we already possess would not help us. Darwin 
needed no facts for the formulation of those principles now known as Dar- 
winism which were not common knowledge in 1840, or even earlier. Dar- 
win’s great achievement was not the discovery of facts, but the formulation 
as Paul Radin speaks of the opponents of the evolutionary school as “anti-evolutionists,” 
The Method and Theory of Ethnology (New York, 1933), p. 4. 
“The work of Dr. Boas and his school has destroyed completely the social evolutionary 
schemes of Morgan and Tylor,” C. W. M. Hart, in Social Evolution and Modern Anthropology, 
in Essays in Political Economy in honor of E .  J .  Uw’ck ,  H. A. Innis, ed. (Toronto), p. 113. 
Primitive Society, p. 162. 
For in his article Relationship Terms and in his still more recent Cultural Anthropology: 
a Science (1936), he has shown that he has not reached the solution. 
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of a theory that would make already known facts intelligible.26 And what 
are the chances of new and qualitatively different facts pertaining to kin- 
ship systems coming to light in the future? After many decades of investi- 
gation in all parts of the world and among all kinds of cultures, i t  seems 
hardly likely, to say the least, that  “something new will turn up” in this 
field, especially in view of the rapid disappearance of primitive cultures. 
To hold out, therefore, the hope of discovering some new element that  will 
solve our problems for us is as vain as i t  is misleading. What we need in 
American ethnology today is not additional facts, but interpretations of the 
facts we already possess in abundance.27 
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“Science advances in two ways, by the discovery of new facts, and by the discovery of 
mechanisms or systems which account for the facts already known. The outstanding land- 
marks in the progress of science have all been of the second kind,” Sir James Jeans, in article 
Relativity, in Encyclopedia Britannica, (14th ed.). Interestingly enough, this article follows 
immediately upon that of Professor Lowie, Relationship Terms. 
9’ “ . . . the main difficulty of ethnology today lies not in the lack of data but in its un- 
certainty as to what to do with the material already in hand. The science has plenty of limited 
objectives, but is weak in its conceptual framework . . . ”, Ralph Linton, The Present Status 
o j  Anthropology, p. 246, in Science, Vol. 87, March 18, 1939. 
